Abstract: Check-in service, being one of the most popular services in Mobile Social
Introduction
Check-in service is the mainstream application of mobile social networks. The users use a mobile device with a positioning function to send their geographical position to the mobile social network server, and select the semantic location corresponding to the geographical position for a check-in. However, the privacy disclosure has become the primary obstacle for a check-in service [1] . The trajectories formed by the users' check-in records over a period of time can cause the exposure of the users' tracks [2] . The attackers can analyze the users' behaviour patterns of that day, then speculate on the users' identity, and can even predict the users' future trajectory. Trajectory anonymization [3] , by way of dummy location, reconstructs the true tracks for privacy preserving. Data suppression [4, 5] restricts the release of a certain sensitive position on the trajectory or it restricts the trajectory segments that may lead to disclosure of sensitive information. Generalization is the mainstream privacy preserving technology of trajectory with trajectory k-anonymity [6] [7] [8] as its representation. The privacy preserving technology of location based on the location service and the privacy preserving technology of the trajectory data have achieved some research results, but they cannot be directly applied to mobile social networks. In recent years researchers have made studies on the privacy in mobile social networks, such as the location inference attack [9] in mobile social networks, the location privacy preserving and the absence privacy preserving [10] in mobile social networks, the location privacy preserving of proximity based services [11, 12] , and so on. Making use of the prefix trees, the authors in [13] have achieved privacy protection of trajectory k-anonymity. This paper uses the means of the buffer user check-in sequences proposed in [13] , constructs a bit matrix to achieve k-anonymity privacy preserving. The experiment has proved that the method is more efficient.
System structure
This paper uses the central server system structure proposed in [13] . The central server system structure is composed of a client, a privacy preserving server and a service provider. Presuming that the privacy preserving server and users are reliable, only pseudonym users in the system use the privacy preserving service. Before using the check-in service, the users are required to send a registration request to the privacy protection server. The user registration module is in charge of the user registration and storage of the personalized privacy preserving parameters set by the users. These parameters mainly include: privacy preserving parameters k, the longest tolerance time Δt, a sensitive location privacy region. When ready to sign, the user first sends a "pre-sign" command to the privacy preserving server. Then the pre-processing module judges if the location submitted by the user is the exact geographical location or a semantic location. If it is the semantic location, the module will directly buffer the user's check-in location; if it is the geographical location, the module will make an anonymous inquiry to the service provider, gain access to a point of interest nearby and then return it to the user, who can select the proper point of interest for another pre-sign. The preprocessing module is also in charge of deleting the sensitive location privacy region of check-in sequences. According to the user check-in sequences, the privacy preserving module constructs a bit matrix, gains access to k-anonymity sequences and signs to the service provider.
3. The generation algorithm of k-anonymity check-in sequence The generation algorithm of k-anonymity check-in sequence comprises the following steps:
Step 1. Preprocessing of the check-in sequence: Delete the location belonging to a predefined sensitive location privacy region in the users' check-in sequence;
Step 2. Sort the check-in sequence according to the check-in location ID, build a bit matrix and finally get k-anonymity which could be signed.
Step 1 is implemented by a preprocessing module, not described herein. At Step 2 the paper transforms the k-anonymity problem into a frequent item sets mining problem based on a bit matrix, deletes the check-in position which is less than k and gets k-anonymity check-in sequence. The following check-in sequence examples linked with Fig. 1 (a) are used to introduce the algorithm steps:
Step 1 For example, assume that the privacy parameter k is 3,
BV L ={11 100 000 000}, the number of "1" in the result is not less than k, so A[1, 2] is set to 1, A[11, 2] is set to 1. The matrix constructed according to the above method is expressed in Fig. 1b . In the bit matrix, except for the last line, if A[i, j] is equal to 1, record the values of i and j and then form a sequence which is denoted as S 2 . From Fig. 1b we can obtain: S 2 ={{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 5}, {2, 7}, {2, 8}, {3, 4}, {3, 5}, {4, 5}, {7, 8}}.
Step 3. Expand the last item of the subsequence in the sequence S n to generate a sequence S n+1 . Let S n ={i 1 
BV is not less than the privacy parameters K, then {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i n , i u } is recorded into S n+1 sequence. Extend the sequence successively until a new sequence could not be expanded.
For example, in connection with the bit matrix in Fig. 1b , analyze the specific process of the sequence extension. Assume that the privacy parameter k is 3, M = 11, when n = 2, the subsequence {1, 2} of S 2 is extended to 
BV L = {11 100 000 000} the number of "1" is not less than the number of the privacy parameters k, thus {1, 2, 3} ⊂ S 3 . Extend each subsequences, the final sequence set obtained is as follows: S 3 ={{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, {2, 7, 8}}, S 4 ={{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 4, 5}},
Step 4. Restore the sequence in S n (n ≥ k) into the check-in sequence S′ n . Compare the check-in sequence L i and S′ n , get the k-anonymity sequence which could be signed by the longest common subsequence. 
Traverse the sign sequence in Fig. 1 , select S' n having the same length subsequence according to the check-in sequence length of u i to make a comparison and get the longest common subsequence. For instance, to get the longest common subsequence between the check-in sequence of u 6 and S' 4 , the result is 7 's check-in sequence length is 3, to get the longest common subsequence with S' 3 , the result is
Ultimately, the sign obtained on the k-anonymous sequence is shown in Fig. 1c . The following description is given based on a bit matrix for k-anonymity check-in sequence algorithm.
Algorithm. for all sequences {i 1 The algorithm of this paper uses Java, running on E5800 3.2 GHz processor and Windows XP platform with 2 G memory which also use true check-in data on Brightkite of [14] . The data sets are collected data from 24 months and the data set properties are shown in Table 1 . We use k-anonymity algorithm [6] as a comparison algorithm. The parameters of the experiment include the privacy protection parameters k, the check-in sequence Length len and the maximum tolerable time Δt. The check-in success rate c s reflects the proportion of the users' original check-in location contained in the k-anonymity check-in sequence and uses the next formula to measure:
denotes the number of the check-in locations of k-anonymity check-in sequence; | L ChS | i indicates the number of check-in locations of the original check-in sequence.
The experiment randomly selects the check-in sequence in the data set from 4000 users and does not consider the changes in the maximum tolerance time, while testing the influence on the check-in success rate from the privacy protection parameters k and the sequence Length len. This algorithm is denoted by BMC (Bit Matrix Check-in privacy preserving algorithm). Fig. 2 shows the check-in success rate of the algorithm. The values of the privacy protection parameters k increases from 5 up to 12. As it can be seen from Fig. 2a , the check-in success rate decreases with the increase of the privacy parameters k. The increases in k cause more losses of the check-in location, which results in the decrease of the check-in success rate. Meanwhile, the increases in the check-in sequence due to a failure of anonymity of (k, δ)-anonymity algorithm also lead to a decline in the check-in success rate. From the comparison experiment we can get the idea that the success rate of the algorithm in this paper is much higher.
Length of the check-in sequence and check-in success rate
The value of the sequence length of the location fluctuates between 5 and 30; it increases by 5 each time. The value of the location sequence length relates to the dataset properties. Selecting the check-in sequence randomly from 4000 users, the experiment intercepts and complements the value randomly that satisfies the length requirement. From Fig. 2b , when k equals 10, the increase of the check-in sequence length leads to the decrease of the algorithm check-in success rate. The reason is that the longer the location sequence is, the less the identical location sequence will be, which may result in a greater loss of location. Due to the limited impact of the increase of the sequence length on the trajectory distance and clustering results, the growth of the sequence length barely affects the check-in success rate of (k, δ)-anonymity.
4.2.3. The longest tolerance time and check-in success rate Fig. 2c indicates the impact of the longest tolerance time on the check-in success rate. The longest tolerance time is the time of a cache check-in sequence. In the analysis of the data set attributes, the paper gets the time interval of the check-in data set through an experiment as Table 1 shows. The value of the longest tolerance Δt is 1-5 times of the average check-in time. In the experiment, the value of k is 10, there are no specific restrictions on the check-in sequence length. In Fig. 2c the increase of the check-in success rate of the algorithm is accompanied by the growth of the longest tolerance time. Besides, the more the cache of the check-in sequence is, the easier the k-anonymous check-in sequence is generated; while the less the check-in sequence is, the greater loss in the check-in location k-anonymous sequence is generated. So does the method of (k, δ)-anonymity: the more the cache of the location sequence is, the more possible is the search for a k-anonymous set through a cluster.
According to the experiments, the method introduced in the paper significantly outperforms the method of (k, δ)-anonymity in the success rate of the check-in. 
Conclusions
Connected with the problem of privacy disclosure of the location and trajectory of pseudonym users in mobile social networks, the paper presents tools for privacy protection based on a bit matrix which ensures both the trajectory privacy of the users and a higher success probability of the check-in. Through transformation of the trajectory k-anonymity into k-frequent item sets mining based on the bit matrix, the method deletes the check-in location whose support degree is less than k and gets the check-in sequence of k-anonymity. The method not only simplifies the searching process of the trajectory k-anonymity set and saves the storage by a bit matrix, but also reduces the calculation and improves the privacy protection.
